EXTREME PREJUDICE

I was convinced that the Intelligence Community could read the tea leafs, too. It did not look good for U.S. propaganda on Saddam's weapons stocks.

My job was not to criticize, however. It was to secure maximum compliance, and wrest as many concessions from Baghdad as possible, as part of a comprehensive resolution. I kept going.

Over the next 18 months of back channel talks, Iraq's offer to the United States came to encompass all of the following: 126

- 1. As of October, 2000, Baghdad agreed to resume U.N. weapons inspections. That was 18 months before the world community was told of Baghdad's acquiescence.
- 2. Likewise as of October, 2000, Iraq promised to grant U.S. Oil Companies access to first tier contracts for oil development and leasing on all new exploration sites. The U.S. could receive second tier and third tier contracts under sites already leased to Russia or France. Taking first tier contracts away from Russia or European countries would have been controversial at this phase and politically impossible. However, Iraq had ways of cutting U.S. Oil into the mix of existing exploration and development contracts. Future oil development would have included the U.S. on first tier concessions. Iraq also promised to make major purchases of U.S. oil equipment, which it freely declared to be the best in the world.
- 3. Baghdad offered to buy 1 million American-made automobiles every year for 10 years in order to replace its citizens' outdated fleet of automobiles throughout Iraq. Because of purchase restrictions under U.N. sanctions, most automobiles in Iraq predated the mid 1980s. That guaranteed an enthusiastic market for U.S. auto manufacturers in any post-sanctions period. Iraq's commitment to purchase 1 million U.S. automobiles every year would have translated into thousands of high-paying Labor Union jobs in the Rust Belt of the United States—concentrating heavily in Michigan, Ohio, Indiana and Pennsylvania, which have been crippled by the loss of factory investment. It would have guaranteed a foundation of prosperity for America's workers.
- 4. Iraq promised to invest heavily in U.S. telecommunications products and services.
- 5. Iraq agreed to lean heavily to the purchase of U.S. health care and hospital equipment and services, in any post-sanctions period.
- 6. Iraq promised to allow all U.S. Corporations to reenter the Iraqi Market in any post-sanctions period at the level that they had operated prior to the first Gulf War. I was careful to avoid any dual use military industries or factory production at this phase of my talks. Dr. Fuisz had provided critical testimony in a Congressional investigation of U.S. corporations that supplied weapons systems to Iraq before the first Gulf War. There was no danger that he would have tolerated, or mistakenly supported, dual-use weapons contracts in addressing opportunities for American corporations in post-sanctions Iraq.
- 7. Iraq agreed to contribute as a major partner in U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. Time and again, Baghdad made it quite clear: Any special preference that the United States demanded, the United States could have—anything at all.

Every offering was reported to Dr. Fuisz and Andy Card. We followed the same strategy and reporting process that had worked so successfully for us during the Lockerbie talks.